

**CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION
NORTHERN IRELAND:
A "LIGHT TOUCH" REVIEW**

JUNE 2008

Introduction

1. On the 29 February 2008 I was commissioned by the Criminal Justice Policy Division (CJPD) of the Northern Ireland Office to carry out a review of Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJINI). My terms of reference, set out in full in **Appendix A**, noted that with the formal inauguration of CJINI in October 2004 it was “an appropriate time to undertake ‘a light-touch’ review of CJINI in line with Cabinet Office guidance.”

Background

2. Paragraph 15.72 of the “Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland”, published in March 2000, recommended “the creation of a statue-based, independent Criminal Justice Inspectorate”. Subsequently, Section 45 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 gave legislative effect to the proposal by establishing “The Office of the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body.”

Methodology

3. As required by my terms of reference, my review involved extensive consultation with CJINI’s customers and stakeholders. It was undertaken in the context of the anticipated devolution of policing and criminal justice matters. Devolution was envisaged by the Criminal Justice Review in March 2000 as the key to improving democratic accountability in the criminal justice system. A full list of those I consulted is in **Appendix B**. They included not only representatives of the various criminal justice organisations inspected by CJINI, but also partnership inspectorates and other oversight bodies, plus several voluntary sector organisations. I am

indebted to those I spoke to for their willingness to participate in the review and for their frankness. (This frankness was particularly true of CJINI's own inspectors who showed a welcome capacity for self assessment and self criticism). The collective insights of those I consulted into the operation of CJINI and their suggestions for improvement have underpinned much of my analysis – although the conclusions and recommendations at the end of this report are my own.

4. In January 2004 the Chief Inspector, Kit Chivers, published a "Prospectus for a new Criminal Justice Inspectorate in Northern Ireland." In it he set out the principles he intended CJINI to adopt in inspecting Criminal Justice organisations, drawn from principles for the inspection of public services promulgated by the Cabinet Office in 2003. I sought to apply those same principles to CJINI in my review and much of my consultations with stakeholders etc focussed on them. They are worth repeating. Public services inspection should:

- pursue the purpose of improvement;
 - focus on outcomes;
 - take a user perspective
 - be proportionate to risk;
 - encourage self-assessment by managers;
 - use impartial evidence, wherever possible;
 - disclose the criteria used for judgement;
 - be open about the processes involved;
 - have regard to value for money, including that of the inspecting body;
- and
- continually learn from experience."

5. In addition, the CJINI give me unrestricted access to its library of reports and other published documents as well as some pertinent background papers. This material proved of great value as I prepared for my consultations and tested emerging conclusions and recommendations against the written evidence.
6. I have structured my report to cover the key topics which emerged from my "light-touch" review, incorporating in the process the various issues in my terms of reference. My report concludes by looking at the strategic aims of CJINI, followed by my conclusions and recommendations.

Overview

7. It is a truism to say the CJINI has a most challenging role. It is a relatively small inspectorate, with only six inspectors apart from the Chief Inspector and his deputy. Yet its role, unique in these islands, extends across all the major criminal justice organisations, plus a number of other bodies whose responsibilities include criminal justice functions. It is responsible for inspecting some 20 agencies with a role in the criminal justice system. It is a tribute to CJINI that in its short life it has been able to undertake a large number of both single-organisation and multi-organisation reviews, sometimes in partnership with other inspectorates, and produce 35 full reports and nine review reports between March 2005 and May 2008 – the vast majority of whose recommendations have been accepted by the agencies concerned.

Independence

8. I found, throughout the criminal justice field, a widespread recognition of both the importance and the value of an independent inspectorate. All

agreed that it was a vitally important means of inspiring public confidence in the criminal justice system. All generally welcomed CJINI's reports, despite occasional disagreements with some of its analysis and conclusions. Those reports which addressed thematic topics on a cross-cutting basis were particularly highly regarded. It was in these areas that CJINI was perceived to have added most value.

9. With a few exceptions, those I consulted believed that CJINI's arm's-length relationship to government as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body was the right one. I concur with this view. Experience of its first four years of operation confirms that CJINI enjoys sufficient freedoms and flexibilities to enable it to discharge its important responsibilities with independence, impartiality, integrity and fairness. However, later in this report I make some recommendations on how CJINI's relationship to the NIO might be improved without compromising its independence.
10. **I recommend no change in CJINI's constitutional status.**

Collaboration

11. Although CJINI was perceived to jealously guard its independence, stakeholders welcomed its collaborative approach to undertaking its inspections. This approach has not prevented it from making critical comments, when the need arose. Even then, its recommendations are generally construed as contributing to the CJINI's strategic aim of "promoting the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland".

12. There are inevitable tensions. The CJINI could not properly fulfil its role without at times incurring the disagreement of the organisations it inspects to some of its analysis and conclusions. This is to be expected and is not unhealthy, as long as both the inspectors and the inspected continue to respect the integrity of the other and work on a collaborative basis for the good of the criminal justice system and its customers as a whole. In this respect it is vitally important that CJINI: continues to “triangulate” its evidence; refrains from the use of anecdote; allows agencies to comment on the factual accuracy of draft reports; and issues press releases which are fair and give credit where it is due.

13. Under Kit Chivers’s highly regarded leadership, the CJINI has pursued a collaborative approach, eschewing unnecessary confrontation. I believe that this approach is commendable and best calculated to secure the support of the organisations inspected and their management boards. This is important when it comes to implementing recommendations which have been the product of extensive consultation and analysis and tested robustly against available evidence. But more importantly, it serves to encourage organisations to be self critical and adopt a culture of self improvement, which in an ideal world would remove the need for external and independent review.

14. Even if such a world existed, there would still be benefit in benchmarking performance against internationally recognised standards and in having the capacity to undertake cross-cutting reviews which would break down the silos between criminal justice organisations. (Indeed one stakeholder argued that the fragmentation of criminal justice organisations was such it could not be described as a “system”). Some of these silos have their

origin in the proper need for organisations to remain independent in the pursuit of justice to the citizen. But the CJINI's report on "Avoidable Delays" illustrates the benefit of reviewing thematic topics across the criminal justice system.

15. Stakeholder organisations welcomed the opportunity to comment on the factual accuracy of reports at draft stage and to note where they believed the evidence was insufficient to support conclusions. However, some felt there would be merit in more transparency during the review itself. This had been, at least partially, achieved in some reviews through preliminary meetings to agree the "issues" to be explored and the establishment of a "steering committee", at a senior level within the organisation(s) being inspected, to receive regular reports on progress. The development of a "no surprises" regime could enhance collaboration.

16. It was suggested to me that CJINI should develop a formal "protocol" with stakeholder organisations which would govern its operations. It was felt that this would remove some of the current tensions, while safeguarding the interests of both parties. Such a document already exists, albeit in an informal and incomplete form. The "Prospectus for the new Criminal Justice Inspectorate in Northern Ireland", issued in January 2004, sets out CJINI's policy for the conduct of its inspections. The recently issued protocol between the Crown Prosecution Service and Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate sets out the responsibilities of both parties to an inspection. It contains a model which bears examination in the context of Northern Ireland. Some four years after the publication of the original Prospectus the time is right to review it and extend it to cover the reciprocal responsibilities of the agencies inspected.

17. **I recommend that the new Chief Inspector should review at an early stage the Prospectus, in consultation with stakeholders, with a view to developing a Protocol setting out the responsibilities of all parties to an inspection.**
18. That review should address the expectations of stakeholders and opportunities for enhancing collaboration, to the extent that CJINI's independence is not compromised. It would also confirm the importance attached by CJINI to a culture of openness and accountability to customers and stakeholders. Following that review it would be appropriate for the CJINI to revisit its own document "Notes for Inspectors" issued in February 2005, consulting with partner inspectorates, to reinforce not only agreed procedures but also a uniform culture, drawing on the new Protocol.
19. **I recommend that the new Chief Inspector should review in consultation with partner inspectorates, the "Notes for Inspectors" in the light of the new Protocol.**
20. Collaboration is also important among those inspectorates and oversight bodies operating in the same area. I commend the efforts made by the current Chief Inspector to collaborate with other such bodies in the choice of inspection topics and their timing. These discussions could be undertaken as a more systematic basis prior to CJINI's Stakeholder Conference. **I recommend that the new Chief Inspector should more systematically collaborate with other inspection and**

oversight bodies in the choice of inspection topics and their timing.

Relationship with the NIO

21. The independence of CJINI from the NIO is another important dimension of the architecture of the criminal justice system. While it “reports” to the NIO, and “is expected to support the Government’s aims and objectives” (“Criminal Justice as a Shared Future” February 2008) it exists at arm’s length from it. Over the years the NIO has maintained that arm’s length relationship, although ministers have occasionally asked it to undertake particular reviews eg the Management of Sex Offenders and Community Restorative Justice Schemes. The former helped to inform the decision to abolish automatic 50% remissions for offenders and to introduce extended and indeterminate sentences for certain categories of dangerous offenders.

22. According to “The Government’s Policy on Inspection of Public Services” published by the Office of Public Services Reform in 2003: “inspectors should be guided by the threefold purpose of providing assurance, helping to improve the service and informing policy.” While there is considerable evidence of CJINI fulfilling the first and second purposes of “inspections”, there is less evidence of the third – although, as noted above, ministers have occasionally asked for ad hoc inspections to be undertaken. It is my perception, reinforced by my extensive consultations, that CJINI currently operates with limited direction from the NIO on those strategic reviews which might inform policy. Moreover, there could be particular issues of interest to the NIO which could be addressed in some or all reviews. For

example, I am conscious of a particular policy interest in the treatment of victims and witnesses across the criminal justice system.

23. It would of course undermine its independence were CJINI to be subject to “control” by the NIO or Criminal Justice Board, which comprises the heads of various core agencies. Nor would it be desirable for CJINI to play a part in formulating policies, the delivery of which it would then inspect. However, it should be possible for the NIO (and in time the relevant Departments and Assembly Committees) to point to areas for inspection which reflected its own strategic priorities.

24. CJINI’s inspection programme has been developed in the context of the NIO’s four strategic aims:
 - (1) “to provide an independent fair and effective criminal justice system for the community;
 - (2) to work together to help reduce crime and the fear of crime;
 - (3) to make the criminal justice system as open, inclusive and accessible as possible, and promote confidence in the administration of justice; and
 - (4) to improve service delivery by enhancing levels of effectiveness, efficiency and co-operation within the criminal justice system.”

25. Meanwhile, CJINI’s 2004 Prospectus notes that it “will have a particular concern for the interest of victims and witnesses of crime, for the

rehabilitation of offenders and the prevention of re-offending.” Subsequent business plans have set out CJINI’s inspection programme, for the year in question, but without any explicit link between the NIO’s (or indeed CJINI’s) strategic aims and the programme. CJINI’s strategic aims, articulated in both its 2007/08 and 2008/09 business plans, include: “undertaking a wide range of cross-cutting thematic reviews of subjects of importance to the criminal justice system”. Yet there seems no mechanism beyond the annual Stakeholder Conference for these subjects to be identified. Moreover, the annual conference, as reported to me, has been ineffective in this regard. It provides a welcome opportunity for stakeholder bodies to react to the CJINI’s proposed inspection programme, but rarely does it identify new topics – cross-cutting or otherwise.

26. **I therefore recommend that the NIO through the Criminal Justice Board should develop a more explicit framework of strategic priorities for the criminal justice system, which would guide CJINI in its selection of inspection topics and help inform the NIO’s policies.**

27. To date, the NIO has played no explicit role in the follow-up and monitoring of action plans, agreed by agencies and CJINI on foot of the latter’s reports. The CJINI lacks executive authority to secure implementation, and properly so. Where appropriate that role should fall to the NIO or the appropriate sponsor body not least where there are significant resource implications which could affect the priorities of the agency concerned.

28. I understand that several organisations include their annual reports a synopsis of progress against recommendations made by CJINI in relevant reports. **I recommend that this practice should be extended and all criminal justice organisations should include in their annual reports a summary of progress in implementing recommendations in relevant CJINI reports, as set out in action plans.** This requirement should cover both single agency reports and cross-cutting thematic reports.
29. Meanwhile, there are two criminal justice organisations, namely the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Prison Service, where the list of outstanding recommendations from all inspection/oversight bodies is very large. This risks the management boards of both organisations losing sight of strategically important recommendations. Both organisations, and in particular the former, are subject to multiple inspection and oversight regimes which can produce conflicting recommendations. (In the case of the PSNI, I was advised that over twenty independent organisations discharge an inspection or oversight role, albeit with different remits.) Rationalisation (or gate-keeping) of those regimes which have a similar focus to that of CJINI would enhance coherence and reduce overlap, facilitating both organisations in concentrating on strategically important recommendations as opposed to housekeeping ones. (Indeed the latter might be covered in a separate management letter rather than in the full report.) Moreover, such rationalisation could reduce the costs, both of inspection/oversight regimes and of servicing their requirements.

30. Both organisations show evidence of inspection fatigue, while accepting the importance of, and the value to be derived from, independent inspections and reviews.
31. **I recommend that the NIO or other sponsor bodies (as appropriate) should ensure the effective monitoring of strategically important recommendations and, in particular, explore with the relevant agencies the implementation of outstanding recommendations where their scale or nature prevent their implementation within a realistic timescale.** This ground clearance could help smooth the transfer of criminal justice functions to the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Devolution

32. The “Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland” noted the view of many commentators that the:

“devolution of responsibility for Criminal Justice functions to the Northern Ireland Assembly was the key to improving accountability. Criminal justice agencies would come within the control of local politicians and would be subject to regular scrutiny by the Assembly Committee structure and by the Assembly as a whole.”

In the context of devolution, CJINI has a key role to play in providing the necessary independent assurance to enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system. This is a challenge which CJINI is well equipped to discharge through its track record over the past four years in inspecting

criminal justice agencies on both a single and multi agency basis. Indeed it has already given evidence to two Assembly Committees.

33. The devolution of criminal justice functions also seems likely to highlight the cost of the various services and reinforce the search for greater efficiency both within and between agencies. The search for greater efficiency will enhance the profile of CJINI as it discharges its strategic aim of "promoting the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the criminal justice system". In this matter it will have common cause with the Northern Ireland Audit Office. Both organisations are already co-operating in a recently initiated review by CJINI into consultancy costs. This pooling of scarce expertise makes obvious sense, linking the professional expertise of CJINI in respect of the organisations it inspects with the efficiency/VFM expertise of the Audit Office.
34. **I recommend that in advance of the devolution of criminal justice functions CJINI and the NIAO should develop a Protocol for joint working which would ensure the best use of their skills and avoid overlap.**

Partnerships

35. The NIAO is far from being the only organisation with whom the CJINI works in partnership. Over the years it has built up a range of partnerships with a number of bodies, notably Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) and, more recently, Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI). These partnerships have been invaluable and resulted in the

production of a number of joint reports, often on a delegated basis where the lead inspector has come from GB.

36. The unique strength of CJINI lies in its comprehensive remit. Therein also lies its great challenge. Its credibility depends on the skill and professionalism of its small group of inspectors, who could not possibly be expert in all the organisations it inspects. Their expertise can be supplemented by partner inspectorates in these islands bringing their knowledge of internationally recognised standards of best practice (which they have often helped develop) to bear on relevant parts of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland.
37. However, with the devolution of criminal justice functions the profile of CJINI will be enhanced and its inspectors can expect to be asked to present their conclusions more often than before both to ministers and the appropriate Assembly Committees. In this context, it would seem desirable for CJINI to assume a greater leadership role in the conduct of joint inspections with partnership inspectorates contributing their professional skills and knowledge as agents of CJINI. This would involve HMIC operating on the same delegated footing as other HM Inspectorates for England and Wales. It is also an opportune time for CJINI to explore a broadening its partnership working not just with other inspectorates in these islands, including Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, but also with organisations with relevant expertise. Mapping these sources of expertise should be a key responsibility of the next Chief Inspector as he or she develops and commissions future inspection programmes.

38. **I recommend that CJINI should continue to draw on the internationally recognised expertise of partner inspectorates in standard setting and knowledge of good practice; and should explore with partner inspectorates their respective roles post devolution. CJINI should also seek to broaden the base of partnership working.**

Performance

39. My terms of reference require me to consider a number a performance issues. I found CJINI to be well managed and economical in its use of resources, given the number of reports (44) it has produced over its short life with. Indeed in each year of operation it has handed money back to the NIO. It has effective corporate and business planning arrangements. The corporate and business plans contain clear objectives, but there is scope for developing more SMART targets. The 2008/09 business plan contains a welcome focus on developing “communications” as a way of enhancing the profile of CJINI with its customers and stakeholders. Progress against objectives and targets is monitored and recorded in the organisation’s annual report. There are suitable arrangements in place for risk management, within a standard corporate Governance framework. The latter could be enhanced by more effective strategic direction on the part of the NIO, as described earlier.
40. The ultimate test of CJINI is, of course, the outcomes flowing from the implementation of recommendations in its reports on the criminal justice system. Tracking these outcomes is difficult, but could be more transparent through explicit recording of implementation actions and

outcomes in the reports of criminal justice agencies, as recommended earlier.

Inspectors

41. The group of six inspectors comprises a relatively small expert group largely drawn from the key areas subject to inspection. They are ably supported by a committed group of assistant inspectors and administrative staff. They are thinly spread and, as noted earlier, rely in particular areas on partnership inspectorates to deliver jointly their inspection programmes and also inform themselves of best practice elsewhere. Now that the CJINI has completed at least one inspection in each of the various criminal justice agencies it should be possible to focus on a more strategic programme of thematic inspections. This would potentially allow the team to deploy their wide range of talents more effectively than on a series of ad hoc single agency inspections.

42. I welcomed earlier the commendable capacity of the staff in CJINI for self-assessment and self-criticism. They are a highly motivated group with good esprit de corps. In their self-assessment day in October 2007 they undertook a rigorous analysis of performance using the EFQM Excellence Model and identified a range of "changes" they would wish to make in key areas of: policy and strategy; people and leadership; processes; and partners and resources, in order to improve their overall performance. They have also identified the need to improve their communications and have taken steps to do so through the appointment of a communications officer, and the overhaul of its website. I also commend their Community Engagement Initiative, launched earlier this year to assess the main issues surrounding crime which are of interest to the public.

43. A common challenge to all inspectorates is refreshing the team. It is potentially more difficult to keep abreast of professional developments when working outside the areas subject to inspection and there is a constant need to strike the appropriate balance between the pursuit for perfection and the acceptance of the status quo. A challenge facing CJINI after its first four successful years of life, is to develop a strategy for refreshing the inspectorate pool and possibly extending it as a wider range of thematic inspections emerges, including the provision of opportunities for career development. Northern Ireland is a small place and opportunities are moving between CJINI and the core services subject to inspection are more limited than would be the case in a much larger jurisdiction. Nonetheless opportunities for secondments and exchanges within and beyond the criminal justice field could be explored together with the appointment of lay inspectors, including on a sessional basis for particular inspections. The criminal justice voluntary sector would be interested in exploring opportunities for contributing to particular reviews.
44. **I recommend that CJINI develops a succession planning policy which would facilitate the refreshment and extension of the pool of inspectors.**

Strategic Aim

45. The strategic aim of CJINI is “to promote the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland” There can be a tension between this aim and CJINI’s role in enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system, as referred to in the Mission Statement in its Prospectus. Critical reports may be seen by the

agency inspected as undermining, rather than enhancing, public confidence.

46. In the long run, however, it is only through the promotion of “effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness”, that the public can have substantive confidence in the system of criminal justice. The independence of CJINI promises to give the necessary assurance to the public. This places a heavy responsibility on CJINI for ensuring that its reports are impartial, evidence based, objective, fair, contain realistic recommendations and are presented in a balanced way, including through press releases.
47. **I recommend that no change be made to CJINI’s strategic aim of “promoting the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the Criminal Justice System”.**

Conclusions and Recommendations

48. The CJINI has much to be proud of in its short life. It faces an even more challenging future in the context of the devolution of criminal justice functions. “Inspecting for improvement” should continue to be its mantra. The pursuit of continuous improvement in CJINI itself must be matched by the criminal justice system. The goal of the latter should be to be so committed to self improvement that it seeks to work CJINI out of a job.
49. I finish with an appropriate quotation from the current Chief Inspector, Kit Chivers, who is soon to retire. At the last Stakeholder Conference on 17 January 2008 he noted the need for criminal justice agencies to become more self critical and more customer focused:

"Maybe, now the time has come to start talking about the
"criminal justice services rather than "system"".

50. **My recommendations are:**

- (1) there should be no change in CJINI's constitutional status (paragraph 10);**
- (2) the new Chief Inspector should review at an early stage the Prospectus, in consultation with stakeholders, with a view to developing a Protocol setting out the responsibilities of all parties to an inspection (paragraph 17);**
- (3) the new Chief Inspector should review in consultation with partner inspectorates, the "Notes for Inspectors" in the light of the new Protocol (paragraph 19);**
- (4) the new Chief Inspector should more systematically collaborate with other inspection and oversight bodies in the choice of inspection topics and their timing (paragraph 20);**
- (5) the NIO through the Criminal Justice Board should develop a more explicit framework of strategic priorities for the criminal justice system, which would guide CJINI in its selection of inspection topics and help inform the NIO's policies (paragraph 26);**
- (6) all criminal justice agencies should include in their annual reports a summary of progress made in implementing recommendations in relevant CJINI reports as set out in action plans (paragraph 28);**
- (7) the NIO or other sponsor bodies (as appropriate) should ensure the effective monitoring of strategically important**

recommendations and, in particular, explore with the relevant agencies the implementation of outstanding recommendations where scale or nature prevent their implementation within a realistic timescale (paragraph 31);

- (8) CJINI and NIAO should develop a Protocol for joint working in advance of devolution (paragraph 34);
- (9) CJINI should continue to draw on the internationally recognised expertise of partner inspectorates in standard setting and their knowledge of good practice; and should explore with partner inspectorates their respective roles post devolution. CJINI should also seek to broaden its base of partnership working (paragraph 38);
- (10) CJINI should develop a succession planning policy, to refresh and extend the pool of inspectors (paragraph 44); and
- (11) no change should be made to CJINI's strategic aim of promoting "the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the criminal justice system" (paragraph 47).

**JOHN HUNTER
JUNE 2008**

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A 'LIGHT-TOUCH' REVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND

Background

1. Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJINI) is an independent statutory inspectorate, established under the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, constituted as a non-departmental public body. It was formally inaugurated in October 2004, but was operational for some time before that following a recommendation of the Criminal Justice Review.
2. The Chief Inspector is Kit Chivers, who is supported by a Deputy Chief Executive, Business Manager, Media and Communications Officer, six Inspectors, an Assistant Inspector, two Inspection Support Officers and a Business Support Unit.
3. The strategic aim of CJINI is "... to promote the effectiveness, efficiency and even-handedness of the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland." CJINI is sponsored by the NIO in support of the Government's overall aims for the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland.
4. It is now an appropriate time to undertake a 'light touch' review of CJINI in line with Cabinet Office guidance¹. Key issues that should be addressed within the review are outlined below. The review process should include consultation with CJINI's stakeholders and should be carried out in the context of the anticipated devolution of policing and criminal justice matters.

Issues to be addressed

(i) Organisational options

- **The bigger picture** – to what extent does CJINI contribute to the delivery of wider NIO, Government and CJSNI objectives (as reflected in the appropriate Public Service Agreements etc.)? Does CJINI's strategic aim best describe the aim of the organisation; if not, how should it be amended?

¹ Public bodies: A Guide for Departments (2006).
<http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/public/bodies.asp>

- **Links with others** – what links does, or should, CJINI have with other organisations?
- **Past performance** – how has CJINI performed against its aims, objectives, key targets and quality standards? How does it compare with other bodies performing similar functions? How has it used the freedoms and flexibilities it enjoys? How successful have its relationships been with the NIO, Ministers, criminal justice agencies and other inspectorates?
- **Customers' views** – what do CJINI's customers and other interested parties think about its role and performance? It would be helpful if engagement between CJINI and representatives from across the criminal justice system could be facilitated as part of the review process
- **The future organisation** – how should CJINI's services be delivered in the future? Which organisational option is best suited to delivering responsive, efficient and quality services in the future?
- **Good practice** – what examples are there of good practice in how CJINI has delivered its services?

(ii) Improving performance

- **Performance targets** – how far do they reflect CJINI's aims and objectives? Are they sufficiently comprehensive and stretching to drive improvement? Is there sufficient continuity from one year to the next? How is performance validated?
- **Partnership working** – where could CJINI develop joint working arrangements with other bodies to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery?
- **New technology** – how can CJINI make better use of new technology to improve the delivery of its services and functions?
- **Customers' views** – in what ways do CJINI's customers think it can improve the way it delivers its services and functions?

- **Openness and accountability** – how far is CJINI accountable to its customers and other stakeholders for the service it provides? How does it consult on its ways of working and the services it offers and could this be improved? Does it hold open meetings when appropriate? Will CJINI be able to comply with the Freedom of Information Act 2000?
- **Freedoms and flexibilities** – how could CJINI benefit from different freedoms? Could it improve the delivery of its services and functions if it was given more flexibility? How has it exercised the responsibility which it already enjoys?
- **Corporate Governance and reporting** – how well are CJINI, NIO and Ministerial roles and reporting arrangements defined and how could this be improved? Do they provide proper support to operational and policy work? Are there sufficient structures in place to enable CJINI to meet Corporate Governance requirements, and manage risk?

Timescale

5. It is anticipated that the review should take 2-3 months to complete.

Report

6. The final report should make an assessment of CJINI's performance against each of the key issues outlined above and identify recommendations for the future strategic development of CJINI. The report should be drafted in a format suitable for publication.
7. Ownership of the outputs of the review will reside with the Criminal Justice Policy Division of the NIO as the sponsoring Division for CJINI. However, the report will be shared with CJINI and criminal justice agencies as appropriate.

LIST OF CONSULTATIONS

CJINI

Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice

Mr Kit Chivers

Deputy Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice

Mr Brendan McGuigan

Inspector and Assistant Inspectors

Administrative Staff

Stakeholder Agencies

Chief Constable PSNI

Sir Hugh Orde

Assistant Chief Constable PSNI

Mr Drew Harris

Chairman Policing Board

Sir Desmond Rea

Director Public Prosecution Service

Sir Alasdair Fraser

Deputy Director Public Prosecution Service

Mr Roy Junkin

Director General NI Prison Service

Mr Robin Masefield

Director NI Court Service

Mr David Lavery

Head of Operations NI Court Service

Ms Jacqui Durkin

Chief Executive Probation Board for NI

Mr Brian McCaughey

Mr Graham Kelly

Chief Executive Youth Justice Agency

Mr Bill Lockhart

Partner Inspectorates – Oversight Bodies

Inspector HMIC

Mr Ken McWilliams

Chief Inspector HMIP

Ms Anne Owers

Chief Inspector HMCPSI

Mr Stephen Wooler

Chief Inspector Social Services Inspectorate

Mr Paul Martin

Chief Commissioner Human Rights Commission

Ms Monica McWilliams

Voluntary Organisations

Chief Executive Victim Support NI

Ms Susan Reid

Chief Executive NI Association for the Care & Resettlement of Offenders

Ms Olwen Lyner

Chief Executive EXTERN

Ms Liz Cuddy

Director Committee on the Administration of Justice

Mr Mike Ritchie

Government

Director of Criminal Justice (NIO)

Mr Stephen Leach

Deputy Director Criminal Justice Policy Division (NIO)

Mr Gareth Johnston

Deputy Director of Criminal Justice Service Division (NIO)

Mr Brian Grzymek

Attorney General's Office

Mr Kevin McGinty